I. INTRODUCTION
On the campaign trail, then-candidate Donald Trump made an interesting promise: "if I win . . . I'm going to open up the libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money." 1 President Trump's comments betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of defamation law. The President has very little power to shape state common-law tort principles or the constitutional decisions that guide them.
ever sued for defamation, current First Amendment doctrine can plausibly be read as allowing such a suit. This indicates a potentially more ominous misunderstanding by President Trump: that he needs to "open up" libel laws in order to sue. 3 In reality, it would be just as easy for President Trump to bring a defamation suit as President as it was when he was the leader of his business. While defamation suits are ultimately hard to win under current First Amendment doctrine, their strategic use by wealthy public officials to stifle criticism is a dangerous weapon against the press. 4
The current standard for defamation lawsuits by public officials was set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 5 There, the Court decided that the First Amendment allows public officials to sue for defamation under state law only if they can prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice"-i.e., with knowledge that the defamatory communication was false or with reckless disregard for its truth. 6 The Court has since decided numerous other cases regarding defamation suits by public officials, generally fashioning rules that make lawsuits harder for plaintiffs. 7 While the standard makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prevail, it can also subject defendants to extensive discovery and costly trials. If the claims make it to trial, media freedom is left in the hands of juries-notoriously fickle decision-makers. 8 The ability of powerful public figures to bring suit has a chilling effect on journalists-the risk of litigation expenses and potential damages makes them wary to publish reports that might invoke the ire of a wealthy plaintiff. This chilling effect poses First Amendment concerns and motivated the Court in Sullivan to protect the press via a heightened burden of proof for public official plaintiffs. 9 While the current rule's effect may ameliorate concerns about a broad chilling effect on all political reporting, the rule does not go far enough with respect to media coverage of the President. A President who has sufficient personal resources to mount a litigation offensive against the press could bully them into reporting only certain information. This strategy, ostensibly legal 3. One author has credited current Supreme Court doctrine with creating an "exaggerated impression in the minds of some potential plaintiffs and lawyers that the press is impervious to public-plaintiff libel suits" when in fact, that is far from the truth. See, e.g., the cases discussed infra in Section II.E. 8. This is especially true in an age where the majority of Americans believe that media outlets are biased and intentionally publish fake news in order to advance an agenda. See POTUS Less Trusted than Media, "Fake News" Comes from All Sources, MONMOUTH U. POLLING INST. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/reports/MonmouthPoll_US_ 032917/.
9. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
under current doctrine, has been proven effective at the international level.
10
Autocratic leaders around the world have used defamation lawsuits to successfully stifle the political press. In Singapore, for example, the Prime Minister and his family members have used defamation suits for decades to successfully limit critical reporting.
11
Further, aspects of the Presidency distinct from any other public position justify departure from the Sullivan standard in favor of absolute immunity for presidential reporting. First, the President has more power than any other U.S. public official. 12 If one assumes that press freedom should be at its apex when reporting on matters most fundamental to democratic self-governance, then reporting on the President deserves greater protection than reporting on less powerful public officials. Second, the Court has reasoned that public officials and public figures should have a higher defamation burden because they can more easily rebut perceived defamatory claims. 13 The President has more power than any other public official to rebut criticism and thus a unique ability to save face and minimize any damage caused by defamation. This supports a stricter defamation rule for the President. Third, there is no federal statute and many states lack statutes against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation ("SLAPPs").
14 This leaves media outlets vulnerable to a sitting President's transparent attack because state courts lack sufficient tools to dismiss the lawsuits outright. This could subject media defendants to expensive discovery. Fourth, the President has absolute civil immunity from actions he or she takes in an official capacity. 15 For reasons that prompted the Court to grant this immunity in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the press deserves reciprocal immunity for presidential reporting. Finally, there are numerous institutional factors beyond possible legal liability that encourage the White House press corps and other reporters to do their job ethically and report accurately. These constraints, such as reputation and White House access, appropriately limit presidential reporters' incentives to lie and defame the President.
In a political climate dominated by charges of "Fake News" and with the election of a notoriously litigious President, now is an opportune time to explore the implications of allowing a sitting President to bring a cause of action for defamation. This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II presents a summary of the background, facts, arguments concerning, and opinions issued in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. It then briefly describes subsequent Supreme Court cases that clarify the standard that Sullivan sets forth. Part III explores the historically contentious President-press relationship and demonstrates why a presidential defamation suit is a legitimate tactic in the context of the historical effort to combat an unwieldy press. Part IV describes the lack of obstacles a President would face in bringing a defamation suit and how, under the current Sullivan standard, the President could win. Part V criticizes Sullivan and argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a zero-liability rule for defaming a sitting President.
II. NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN

A. Facts
The case arose in 1960 in the midst of the civil rights movement. Martin Luther King, Jr., arrested for the fourth time in as many years, had become the target of increasingly vicious violence in Alabama. 16 The Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South published a fullpage advertisement on March 29, 1960 , in the New York Times soliciting funds to assist with his legal defense and other civil rights activities. 17 The advertisement, the subject of the defamation suit, described the oppression African Americans faced in the South and implored the public to support Dr. King.
18
The advertisement, along with another article describing the racial violence in Montgomery, instantly sparked controversy. 19 On April 19, 1960, three Montgomery City Commissioners (including L.B. Sullivan) filed the first in a series of civil suits against the Times, Dr. King, and some of the Committee leaders who had taken out the advertisement. 20 To the Southern officials, these suits were a means of striking back against increasing outside criticism and pressure to reform traditionally oppressive treatment of African Americans.
21
Many in the South viewed the civil rights movement as a communist conspiracy, and media outlets like the Times confirmed the view that, at the very least, the disturbances were caused by outside agitation.
22
The stakes were tremendous for both sides in the lawsuits. If the Alabama city officials vindicated their claims in court, they would have a powerful tool for suppressing negative media portrayals of the South and police brutality. The Times faced the daunting specter of both a sizeable judgment in this particular case and a degradation of their ability to criticize public officials across the country. other legal challenges to the lawsuit, a trial was held. 24 The trial environment was not favorable to the defendants. The Montgomery Press was decidedly proplaintiff and the jury was all white. 25 The local press outed the jurors' names to the rest of the community, 26 undoubtedly increasing the pressure on them to find the Times liable. The presiding judge openly revealed his biases before trial even started by segregating the courtroom "for the good of all people" in attendance and stating his disdain for the Fourteenth Amendment in open court: "the white man's justice . . . will give the parties equal justice under the law."
27
The unconscionably unfair trial culminated in a unanimous jury verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $500,000.
28 This set the stage for an eventual challenge in the Supreme Court.
29
B. Arguments
Professor Herbert Wechsler represented the New York Times in its appeal to the Supreme Court. 30 He primarily argued that allowing states to recognize a public official's right to sue for libel in any circumstances was akin to reviving the Sedition Act of 1789-which made it a criminal offense to communicate "false, scandalous and malicious writings" against either the government or government officials "with intent to defame"-and was therefore unconstitutional.
31 M. Roland Nachman, an Alabama attorney, represented Sullivan. 32 He made numerous arguments for why the Supreme Court should uphold the jury verdict, including that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict and that the verdict was unreviewable under the Seventh Amendment.
33 Nachman also argued that there was no precedent supporting immunity from defamation suits by public officials and that it had no basis in the First Amendment.
34
C. Majority Opinion
In Sullivan, the Court unanimously agreed that the First Amendment prohibited Sullivan's state-law defamation claim. 35 The Court held that the First Amendment protects citizens against defamation suits by public officials in most circumstances. 36 To justify this decision, it distinguished the wide body of case law stating that the First Amendment does not protect libel by noting that "[n]one of the cases sustained the use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the official conduct of public officials." 37 The Court quoted numerous legal scholars to support the claim that the Framers preferred to let good ideas drown out bad ones rather than impose silence on certain speech by law. 38 It reaffirmed the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 39 Accordingly, "erroneous statement[s]" must be tolerated in order to give freedom of expression adequate "breathing space" to survive.
40
Picking up on one of Professor Wechsler's main arguments, the Court noted that James Madison and Thomas Jefferson's early rejection of the Sedition Act lent further support to this interpretation of the First Amendment. 41 Rejection of the Act confirmed some influential Framers' conception about the scope of the First Amendment's protection for the press. 42 The Court held that Alabama's civil defamation law was tantamount to the Sedition Act (which the Court assumed was unconstitutional 43 ) and was therefore unconstitutional itself. 44 After laying this groundwork, the Court declared a rule prohibiting the recovery of damages for publishing a defamatory falsehood related to official conduct unless that statement is made with "actual malice"-i.e., "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not." 45 The Court supported this new rule by citing a Kansas Supreme Court decision and a number of other state court opinions that adopted a similar rule.
46
In the last section of the opinion, the Court applied its new test to the facts in the case and concluded that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that actual malice existed. 47 Further, the Court found that there was not sufficient proof that the advertisement's statements were "of or concerning" By applying the actual malice standard to the facts in this way, the Court effectively foreclosed any further attempts to pursue this case on remand. 49 The majority opinion was largely heralded as a complete victory for the New York Times, the free press, and the civil rights movement.
50
D. Concurring Opinions
Justice Hugo Black and Justice Arthur Goldberg authored separate concurring opinions, each joined by Justice William Douglas. Justice Black favored reversal of the jury verdict because he believed the Times "had an absolute, unconditional constitutional right to publish [the] criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials."
51 He did not agree that the majority's actual malice standard would adequately protect the right to freely discuss public matters. 52 In particular, Justice Black took issue with the use of libel as a political tool to suppress certain viewpoints:
. . . this technique for harassing and punishing a free press-now that it has been shown to be possible-is by no means limited to cases with racial overtones; it can be used in other fields where public feelings may make local as well as out-of-state newspapers easy prey for libel verdict seekers.
53
"Absolute immunity" from libel lawsuits, he claimed, was the only possible way to protect the press from "destruction."
54
Justice Goldberg agreed that citizens should have an "absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct" and that the privilege should not depend upon "probing by the jury of the motivation" of the speaker. 55 Justice Goldberg further commented that speech about public affairs would be chilled if speakers risked civil liability and that the ability of "minority groups to secure publication of their views on public affairs and to seek support for their causes will be greatly diminished." 56 Echoing the majority, Justice Goldberg reiterated that in many jurisdictions, judicial officers are cloaked with absolute immunity for defamatory statements because "to submit all officials . . . to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of 48 57 This logic applies to protection for the press: if government officials are protected from libel for official conduct, the press and ordinary citizens should be given the same protection when criticizing their government.
58
While these concurrences serve as the ideological basis for the some of the arguments made in this article, the absolutist position they espouse has largely been relegated to a historical footnote. Public officials have brought numerous high-profile defamation suits in the years since this opinion was issued under the actual malice standard. 59 The Court has had numerous opportunities to revisit the Sullivan standard and has implicitly rejected the Black/Douglas/Goldberg absolute immunity position. However, the Court has expanded and altered the Sullivan standard in significant ways in the proceeding decades. The following subsection describes Supreme Court jurisprudence clarifying the Sullivan standard.
E. Expanding and Contracting Sullivan
Defamation law is expansive and complex. Individual states define defamation differently and all of those definitions interact in unique ways with the Supreme Court's constitutional standards. 60 Since Sullivan, the Supreme Court has mainly strengthened protections for the press from libel lawsuits by public officials. However, in a couple important ways, the Court has narrowed the standard and left public officials with troubling power to harass and intimidate the press.
Expanding Protection for the Press
The case law largely addresses two key terms in Sullivan: the definition of "actual malice" and what constitutes a "public figure" for purposes of applying the standard. Subsequent cases have confirmed that the "actual malice" requirement is a misnomer. Indeed, one member of the Sullivan majority later expressed regret in a 1979 opinion with the language the Court chose for the standard because "malice as used in the New York Times opinion simply does not mean malice as that word is commonly understood." 61 With respect to reckless disregard, a defamation defendant's failure to investigate the truth or falsity of his statements does not in itself establish reckless disregard as an element of actual malice. 64 It is not a negligence standard. 65 The Court admitted that the exact contours of the term "reckless disregard" in the defamation context would be determined on a case-by-case basis, but that a defendant must "entertain[ ] serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" to satisfy this requirement.
66
The Court has also provided lengthy guidelines regarding who constitutes a "public figure" under the Sullivan standard. For purposes of this Article, an extended discussion of these decisions is unnecessary: the President is undoubtedly a public figure. 67 Post-Sullivan, the Court also mandated that appellate courts conduct an independent constitutional review of the facts after a defamation claim succeeds on the merits at the trial level. 68 This rule "abrogates the usual rule that jury determinations are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous." 69 The Court has stated that "judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution." 70 This principle has allowed the Court to hear numerous defamation cases in the years since Sullivan and decide on a case-by-case basis whether particular facts satisfy the Sullivan standard. Baer, the Court held that although specific guidelines for who qualifies as a public official should be determined on a case-by-case basis, only "those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs" are subjected to the Sullivan standard. 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) . It further clarified that a public official must be specifically named in the allegedly defamatory material, and cannot be "one of a small group acting for an organ of government." Id. at 82. The Court has also held that a candidate for public office must be subjected to the heightened Sullivan standard, Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971) Finally, the Court definitively held that Sullivan requires a heightened, clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard for proving actual malice. 72 It has required Plaintiffs to prove a defamatory statement false in order to state a claim for defamation. 73 And, the Court also replaced the traditional common-law presumption that defamatory statements are false and replaced it with a burden on the plaintiff to prove falsity and fault.
74
The post-Sullivan defamation decisions largely solidified press protection from libel lawsuits by public officials. The definitions of public official and public figure are extremely broad, making the Sullivan standard widely applicable. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove falsity. The actual malice standard, although vague, is an extremely difficult standard for plaintiffs to satisfy-and they must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, even if a public official plaintiff receives a favorable jury verdict, appellate courts functionally review these verdicts de novo and decide whether they pass constitutional muster. However, the Court has abridged press freedom in two important ways since Sullivan.
Narrowing Press Protection
In two significant ways, the Court has removed barriers to public official 75 defamation suits. First, multiple Court decisions affirm that some factual scenarios establish valid defamation claims by public officials within Constitution limits. 76 From these cases, plaintiffs can draw analogies to their own defamation cases and make stronger arguments for why they satisfy the Sullivan standard. Second, in Herbert v. Lando, the Court held that a media defendant's internal communications about publishing decisions and the "editorial process" are discoverable in defamation litigation.
77
The Court both cases as though it were a jury and reaches [a] conclusion." Butts, 388 U.S. at 171 (Black, J., dissenting). This is a problem not only because it "is a flat violation of the Seventh Amendment," but also because " 75. This includes public figures as well. The Court has shied away from any meaningful distinctions between the two in terms of which standard is applied. See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 693 (1989). Thus, this article uses the term "public official" and "public figure" interchangeably, with both terms encompassing both groups.
76. See, e.g., Butts, 388 U.S. at 156-58 (majority opinion) (upholding a defamation verdict against a newspaper publisher for accusing an athletic director of fixing a football game); HarteHanks Commc'ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 693 ("As in Butts, the evidence in the record in this case, when reviewed in its entirety, is 'unmistakably' sufficient to support a finding of actual malice."); see also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (upholding a defamation verdict for relative of suspected KGB agents); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (upholding defamation verdict for a member of a wealthy industrial family against Time magazine because the Court held the plaintiff was not a public official and was exempt from the Sullivan standard).
77. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155 (1979) .
reasoned that plaintiffs attempting to prove actual malice would bear too difficult a burden without access to this sort of discovery.
78
Even though the majority of post-Sullivan cases protect the press, both the Lando decision and lingering uncertainty over the contours of Sullivan have exposed media outlets to the risk of extremely high litigation costs and other burdens. Examples abound in the years following Lando of defamation cases brought by public figures that were extremely expensive to defend. In Westmoreland v. CBS, a retired army general brought a defamation suit against CBS concerning a controversial Vietnam exposé.
79
Despite an eventual dismissal of the case, CBS was forced to spend more than $3.5 million to defend itself. 80 In a similar case, the Washington Post spent about $2 million defending itself against former Mobile Oil President William Tavoulareas. 81 NBC spent about $9 million defending itself against performer Wayne Newton in a defamation action. 82 In 1995, ABC News reportedly spent $15 million in attorneys' fees defending against a lawsuit by multiple tobacco companies for publishing evidence that the tobacco companies manipulated nicotine levels in the manufacturing process. 83 Finally, in 2015 the online news outlet Mother Jones successfully defended itself against a defamation case brought by a major Republican donor, 84 but was forced to spend over $2.5 million in legal fees.
85
Although there is no way to quantify the chilling effect cast by high litigation costs, it undoubtedly makes news outlets more cautious about the information they publish. 86 Even with the high bar that public official plaintiffs must satisfy under Sullivan, discovery costs give wealthy public officials the ability to control the media in constitutionally concerning ways. Justice Marshall strongly emphasized this point in his dissent to Herbert v. Lando:
As members of the bench and bar have increasingly noted, rules designed to facilitate expeditious resolution of civil disputes have too often proved tools for harassment and delay. . ..The possibility of such abuse is enhanced in libel litigation, for many self-perceived victims of defamation are animated by something more than a rational calculus of their chances of recovery. Given the circumstances under which libel actions arise, plaintiffs' pretrial maneuvers may be fashioned more with an eye to deterrence or retaliation than to unearthing germane material. Not only is the risk of in terrorem discovery particularly pronounced in the defamation context, but the societal consequences attending such abuse are of special magnitude. Rather than submit to the intrusiveness and expense of protracted discovery, even editors confident of their ability to prevail at trial or on a motion for summary judgment may find it prudent to steer far wide of the unlawful zone thereby keeping protected discussion from public cognizance. Faced with the prospect of escalating attorney's fees, diversion of time from journalistic endeavors, and exposure of potentially sensitive information, editors may well make publication judgments that reflect less the risk of liability than the expense of vindication.
87
While this phenomenon is troubling for the free press in general, it is particularly troubling with respect to a sitting President. As arguably the most powerful person in the world, the President of the United States deserves the most exacting scrutiny, and thus the risk to the press of in terrorem discovery is at its peak. The next Section recounts the history of President-press relationships and demonstrates that defamation lawsuits could easily be the next tactic in a historically tumultuous struggle to control the President's message and image.
III. THE "DISHONEST" MEDIA: A RECURRING THEME
Presidential contempt for the press is an American tradition. George Washington used to complain bitterly about the media's "willful and malignant misrepresentation" of facts during his presidency. 88 The media consistently lambasted him as a fraud and a traitor and accused him of wanting to be a king. 89 While maintaining an outward resolve in the midst of these attacks, Washington's dislike for the press was no secret. 90 John Adams lamented the press' "narrow bigotry, the most envious malignity, the most base, vulgar, sordid, fishwoman scurillity. While Presidents have had their share of disdain for the press, perhaps the most notably hostile figure towards the press was Richard Nixon. Nixon mounted an all-out offensive against the press during his first term, and ratcheted up the intensity when the Watergate scandal broke.
110 CBS President Frank Stanton noted at the time that "no more serious episode has occurred in government-press relationships since . . . the ill-fated . . . Sedition Act[] forbade criticism of the government [.] " 111 The Nixon White House employed various tactics to manipulate and silence the press: gag orders; false rumors; government agencies including the CIA, FBI, FCC, and FTC were instructed to harass and investigate anti-Nixon news organizations and reporters; wiretaps were ordered against some members of the press; members of the White House gave virulently anti-press news conferences; harsh retribution including criminal charges was doled out to those who leaked government information to the press; the President threatened not to renew federal licenses for media broadcasts; and federal subpoenas were issued to journalists who did not reveal their sources.
112
There is overwhelming evidence that many Presidents, at least for some time during their presidency, harbor resentment towards the media. There is also evidence that Presidents will resort to aggressive tactics to combat perceived media bias or influence reporting. In this effort, Presidents have a tendency to flirt with the line between constitutional and unconstitutional methods. For example, one of the earliest tactics to suppress dissenting voices in the press, the Sedition Act, has been deemed unconstitutional, albeit in dicta.
113 President Roosevelt's directive to prosecute Joseph Pulitzer, although dismissed on other grounds, 114 certainly raised constitutional concerns. President Nixon's harsh tactics and use of government agencies to harass media outlets resembled authoritarian abuse of power.
115 Left unchecked, there is a risk the executive branch will expand its arsenal of press-muzzling weapons into an unconstitutional realm.
Leaders at the state and international level have already used defamation lawsuits against the press successfully. press-conjureghost-richard-nixon ("By contrast, Trump, like Nixon during Watergate, would go after the press purely for personal reasons-not by denouncing the media (or, rather, not just by denouncing the media) but by abusing his powers as president. Bring negative information to light about Nixon and you might lose your television stations. Report harshly on Trump and your tax status might be threatened-and you may even face an antitrust suit. This is the way authoritarians reinforce their power-through fear and intimidation, the rule of law be damned."). The following Section argues that the rules for sitting Presidents are currently the same as for all other public figures. This allows Presidents to assault the media through defamation lawsuits and potentially even win one in the right circumstances.
IV. THE PRESIDENT CAN CURRENTLY BRING (AND POTENTIALLY WIN) A DEFAMATION SUIT
A. The President Can Easily Bring Defamation Suits
The Sullivan standard applies only when the plaintiff is considered a public official or public figure. But once the standard applies, it applies equally to all public officials-from a state water board commissioner to the President of the United States. As such, it is just as easy for the President to bring defamation lawsuits as it is for a private citizen considered a public figure or a low-level public official. While no Supreme Court precedent exists to confirm this, there is no reason to believe the President is not simply a public official for purposes of a defamation suit. As mentioned, a presidential candidate, a former President, and numerous governors have been subject to the standard without comment from the highest Court.
127
Thus, a President with sufficient resources faces few legal barriers to bringing a defamation suit. While the Sullivan standard protects media outlets somewhat from losing the suits on the merits, it leaves the press exposed to intrusive and expensive discovery and trial processes. This is a fact that President Trump was intimately familiar with as a private citizen. President Trump lost six out of seven of his libel lawsuits on the merits, and only won the case against the former Miss USA contestant because she defaulted by failing to appear. 128 While it seems like the consistent failure would have deterred Mr. Trump, evidence suggests that the ultimate resolution of the disputes was not his motivation for bringing them. In 2006, Trump bragged to the Washington Post that he brought a libel lawsuit against an author that alleged Trump overstated his wealth just "to make a point."
129 He continued, "I spent a couple of bucks on legal fees, and they spent a whole lot more. I did it to make [defendant's] life miserable, which I'm happy about. Media defendants have few realistic options for securing dismissal of suits that survive the pleading stage. First, media defendants might argue that no precedent supports a President filing a personal civil lawsuit and that such a claim is not viable. While no sitting President has ever filed such a suit, there is a strong argument that Presidents generally have the power to file civil suits. The seminal case regarding presidential immunity from private actions, Clinton v. Jones, held that a President can be sued while in office for private conduct that occurred before becoming President. 133 In declining to stay the lawsuit, the Court rejected President Clinton's argument that the presidency is so unique and important to the functioning of America that it requires undivided attention.
134
The Court found it improbable that private suits would "occupy any substantial amount of" the President's time and held that allowing the civil suit to go forward did not unconstitutionally enlarge the judiciary's power. 135 Although this does not directly answer the question of whether a President could sue private parties themself, it provides a strong inference that a President can engage in litigation if he or she chooses to.
136 The President's initiation of a lawsuit would likely serve as a waiver to any objections concerning interference with the Executive office caused by being a party in litigation. 137 Second, media defendants might try to take advantage of "anti-SLAPP" (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) protections. Approximately thirty states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes that provide defendants with an effective tool to defend against strategic defamation lawsuits. 138 In states with strong anti-SLAPP legislation, 139 a President would likely face more intense obstacles in attempting to bring a strategic defamation lawsuit. However, many states lack any sort of anti-SLAPP protection at all, 140 that distribute content nationally would likely be subject to jurisdiction in those states. 141 Without any sort of federal anti-SLAPP protection, the President can easily shop for a forum where he or she enjoys high approval ratings, where there is favorable defamation law, and where there is no anti-SLAPP law. While he or she cannot look to foreign jurisdictions to file suit due to a 2010 federal law, 142 plenty of domestic jurisdictions meet this description.
143
B. The President Could Win a Meritorious Defamation Suit
State-law defamation elements vary state to state. California's defamation law exemplifies the standard elements: (1) a false and un-privileged 144 publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, (2) which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, or (3) which causes that party to be shunned or avoided, or (4) which has a tendency to injure that party in [their] occupation. 145 One can imagine the endless array of publications that might satisfy these elements. Consider, for example, some of the claims made about Hillary Clinton during her presidential candidacy. "News" reporting that Clinton was involved in a child sex trafficking ring, 146 insinuating that she was responsible for the "mysterious deaths" of close associates, 147 and stating that she engaged in satanic rituals 148 appears to satisfy the state-law requirements.
After applying the state-law analysis, courts must apply constitutional principles when the plaintiff is a public official. The President is undoubtedly a public official, so the heightened Sullivan standard applies. 149 149. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts commented that the President of the United States would be the clearest example of a public official when considering a spectrum of government President uncovered sufficient evidence that the news outlet knew the falsity of its story or had reckless disregard for its truth, the President could win the suit.
While it may seem fair to provide the President with legal recourse against media outlets that publish blatantly false and defamatory articles, such recourse cannot exist without creating an unacceptable risk of abuse and a concomitant chilling effect on the free press. The First Amendment should provide an absolute bar on defamation actions by a sitting President for allegedly defamatory material published while they were in office or the campaign trail.
V. THE CASE FOR IMMUNITY FROM PRESIDENTIAL DEFAMATION LAWSUITS
If you can't handle the heat, get out of the kitchen. -President Harry S. Truman
A. Sullivan's Shortcomings
Great jurists and scholars have argued that the Sullivan actual malice standard does not go far enough in protecting press freedoms consistent with the First Amendment. In his brief for the New York Times in Sullivan, Professor Herbert Wechsler argued that the First Amendment requires absolute immunity for press statements about public officials.
150 Justices Black and Douglas famously supported that position in their concurring opinions in New York Times v. Sullivan and numerous other concurrences and dissents for years after. 151 Other critics have noted the absurdity of putting the question of "truth" before a jury in the context of political speech. 152 Justice Harlan stated that "'truth' is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to the preexisting prejudices of a jury the determination of what is 'true' may effectively institute employees. See Lane v. MPG Newspapers, 781 N.E.2d 800, 806 (Mass. 2003) ("While we agree that the limited responsibilities of an elected town meeting representative may place that position at the far end of a continuum of elected public officials from that of the President of the United States, the principle of 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' public debate regarding the conduct of those we elect to govern applies equally to both.").
150 And, in at least one context, a state supreme court granted the media absolute immunity from defamation lawsuits by public officials except where that speech incites imminent violence. 155 The Illinois supreme court stated that "it is better that an occasional individual or newspaper that is so perverted in judgment and so misguided in his or its civic duty should go free than that all of the citizens should be put in jeopardy of imprisonment or economic subjugation if they venture to criticize an inefficient or corrupt government." 156 For these and other reasons, some have argued that Sullivan's actual malice standard is flawed. As Professor Anthony Lewis commented, the logic of Sullivan "pointed to the conclusion that Americans may criticize the public actions of public men without fear of any penalty. If there can be no test of truth in political debate, then there can be no libel actions as a result of anything said in such debate."
157 Thus, drawing the constitutional line at knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth seems somewhat arbitrary. 158 The Court provides extensive justification for why the First Amendment prohibits libel actions by public officials in general, but absolutely none for why it draws a line at speech made with actual malice. 159 The Court gave no explanation for why actual malice is a better standard for balancing freedom of the press with common law defamation principles than, say, a negligence standard.
Despite lingering doubt over the decision's logic, the Sullivan standard provides a somewhat practical solution to balancing First Amendment protections with the common-law rights of public officials and figures to protect their reputation. 160 Whether the Sullivan standard goes far enough (or perhaps too far) in protecting media outlets from these attacks from any public official has been debated at length. 161 However, courts and the academic community have not yet considered application of the Sullivan standard to a sitting United States President.
Because of the President's unique and powerful office and because of the potentially devastating chilling effect on presidential reporting, the First Amendment should not tolerate a presidential defamation lawsuit in the United States. The Sullivan standard falls short of providing the press with sufficient "breathing room" to investigate and criticize in this context. The following Section analyzes the President's unique station and why the broad "public official" designation is inappropriate for the President.
B. The President is Unlike Other Public Officials
With the Greatest Power Comes the Greatest Scrutiny
The Constitution vests no other individual in the United States government with even close to as much power as the President. This power gives him or her greater ability to affect national policy than any other public figure at any level of state or federal government. The Constitution grants the President the illdefined "executive power," 162 which has been construed to allow, among other things, unilateral military strikes against foreign nations without Congressional approval, 163 suspension of due process rights for certain American citizens during wartime, 164 the ability to promulgate executive orders, 165 and the ability to decide how vigorously certain laws are enforced. 166 The Appointments Clause allows the President to appoint all cabinet positions, heads of administrative agencies, foreign diplomats, and Article III federal judges. powerful public official in the United States. Accordingly, the law must allow the press greater "breathing room" to investigate the President than other public officials. The Court never explained in Sullivan why the actual malice standard correctly balances investigative freedom and the right of public officials to protect their reputation. However, the level of investigative freedom should correspond to the level of a public official's power and influence. The greater the official's potential public impact, the greater right the public should have to information that bears on that official's fitness for office. For example, a county official with a small role in local government should not be subject to the same defamation standard as a United States Senator. The public interest in investigation of less powerful public figures, like a county official, does not outweigh that official's right to protect his or her reputation. But such a case-by-case rule would likely be unworkable for courts. Thus, the actual malice rule applies broadly with the understanding that it may over-and under-deter defamation lawsuits at the margins.
168
With respect to the President, it is easy to draw a bright line. The actual malice rule is insufficient to ensure press autonomy in presidential reporting. Press freedom should be at its most unconstrained with respect to the President. The argument for the Sullivan actual malice standard loses its persuasive force when applied to the most powerful officials. Thus, the Court should make an exception to the rule for the President.
Presidents Often Have Vast Personal Resources for Lawsuits
George Washington, the first United States President, set the bar high for presidential wealth. 169 While some Presidents were of more modest means, the vast majority of Presidents have been, like Washington, quite wealthy. 170 In modern times, every President since John F. Kennedy has been a multimillionaire before assuming office. 171 Thus the President, more than most other public officials, often has the independent financial capacity to sue. Defamation lawsuits to control media narratives are an increasingly popular tactic among wealthy public figures. 172 As previously noted, President Trump has even admitted to filing tenuous lawsuits prior to the presidency just to intimidate 171. Id.; see also Michael Galvis, Barack Obama's Net Worth on His 55th Birthday, TIME: MONEY (Aug. 4, 2016), http://time.com/money/4439729/barack-obama-net-worth-55th-birthday/ (giving timeline of Barack Obama's wealth and indicating he received millions of dollars in book advances before assuming office). While Richard Nixon was a millionaire for much of its life, the source does not indicate whether he was so before assuming the presidency. Desjardins, supra note 170.
172. See Bazelon, supra note 4 (describing the recent phenomenon of billionaires bankrolling libel lawsuits to destroy media outlets).
defendants.
173 While being wealthy should not preclude an individual from defending their reputation, the combination of wealth and unmatched political power should be cause for concern over the prospect of presidential defamation suits.
Opportunity to Rebut Criticism
One of the crucial pieces of rationale for applying a heightened "actual malice" standard to public officials is that they can more easily respond to defamatory statements than can private individuals. 174 Indeed, this rationale justified extending the actual malice standard to non-government public figures in addition to public officials, 175 and provided grounds for rejecting the application of the standard to private individuals defamed by the media.
176 But as the Court has admitted, this is a generalization: surely not all public officials have the same access to media coverage, and some may have barely any more than a private citizen. 177 Since public figures fall on a wide spectrum with respect to their access to media coverage, an ideal legal standard would be one that partially adjusts based on where the figure falls on that spectrum. 178 In other words, if it were practicable, the Court would impose a stricter standard on public officials who attract significant media attention and a more relaxed standard on public officials with little or no access to media attention. However, considerations of judicial economy forced the one-size-fits-all standard with a threshold "public official" inquiry.
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The President of the United States, with vast power to attract media attention no matter the circumstances, always falls on one extreme of the spectrum. While it would be difficult to assess empirically, it is not unreasonable to claim the President is among a select few in the world who attract more consistent media attention than anyone else. 180 Since Woodrow 173. See Tofel, supra note 129. 174. This was the rationale the Court used in Gertz to deny Sullivan protection to media outlets being sued by private individuals even if the subject at issue was of public concern. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 338-39 (1974 t might seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the final judgment leaves fully protected whatever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who prevailed. But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application.").
179. Id. Wilson scheduled the first news conference in 1913, 181 Presidents have had reporters at their beck and call whenever they wish to deliver a message or answer questions. 182 In fact, a press corps of around 250 journalists stationed in and around the White House keeps vigilant daily watch over the executive branch. 183 The President's access to media has expanded even further in the age of social media. Although Presidents have always sought direct lines of communication to voters, no previous form of communication allowed Presidents such unfiltered, direct access literally into the pockets of everyday Americans. 184 In 2015, Barack Obama launched the @POTUS Twitter account, making him the first President to engage directly with the electorate via social media. 185 President Trump, an active Twitter user as a private citizen, has carried this tradition into the presidency and had over twenty million followers when he was sworn in. 186 President Trump has explicitly stated that Twitter allows him to "fight back" against news stories he considers false or unduly critical. 187 Instead of scheduling press conferences or releasing statements that are often filtered through media outlets, Presidents now need only turn on their smart phones, type in a message, and millions of their followers instantly receive it.
This unparalleled access to media outlets justifies an even stricter defamation standard for sitting Presidents. There is no doubt that if and when a defamatory statement is made about the President, the President has access to a great many means of responding to that statement. The Court has admitted that the Sullivan standard might be too stringent for public officials who have a limited access to media outlets and thus cannot respond easily to criticism. or she deserves a stricter standard.
Presidential Immunity
In Sullivan, the Court justified the actual malice standard by looking at various official libel immunities that states grant to public officers. 189 The Court wrote:
[A]ll [states] hold that all officials are protected unless actual malice can be proved. The reason for the official privilege is said to be that the threat of damage suits would otherwise inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government and dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute . . . in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer.
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Nowhere is this truer than with respect to the President of the United States. However, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, where an ex-military analyst sued the President for damages stemming from a clear case of wrongful termination, the Court held that sitting Presidents are entitled to even greater protection than any state official-Presidents are entitled to "absolute immunity" from damages lawsuits stemming from official acts.
191 Anticipating the difficulty of drawing bright lines concerning the scope of "official acts," the Court held that even actions on the "outer perimeter" of the President's official authority are completely immunized. 192 The Court justified this decision because of potential "diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits."
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The Court's rationale in Nixon can reasonably be extended to justify a reciprocal rule for presidential press coverage. First, freedom of the press is a much clearer and more explicitly enshrined constitutional principle than presidential immunity. 194 Second, if "press" is simply substituted for "President" in numerous passages in Fitzgerald, the logic applies with equal force. Does not the press occupy a "unique position" in our constitutional scheme?
195 Does not the diversion of press energy by concern of private lawsuits "raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government [?]" 196 Does not the press concern itself with matters likely to "arouse the most intense 194. On the one hand, there is actually a strong textualist argument that presidential immunity was specifically rejected by the Framers of the Constitution given the express provision of congressional immunity in the Speech and Debate Clause. See id. at 750 n.31. On the other hand, the First Amendment clearly prohibits the government from making laws "abridging the freedom of speech; or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. While the text by no means implies that any law making any speech illegal is unconstitutional, there was undoubtedly a much clearer constitutional command from the Framers regarding free speech than there was about the President's right to be free from criminal or civil prosecution from any acts he or she takes while in office.
195. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 749. 196. Id. at 751.
feelings[?]"
197 Thus, the press should be afforded absolute immunity with respect to presidential reporting, even if the subject is on the "outer perimeter" of news that might be relevant to an adequately informed public. No constitutional provision elevates the importance of the President's duties above those of the press, and both should be free to conduct their political functions without fear of litigation. In fact, founders such as Thomas Jefferson believed that the free press was more important to the functioning of the country than government itself.
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One of the criticisms of the Sullivan decision is that it assumes, without empirical evidence, that defamation lawsuits will naturally "chill" speech. The following Section analyzes the chilling effect and argues that presidential defamation lawsuits have a particularly high capacity to chill speech.
C. The Chilling Consequences of Presidential Defamation Suits
The Presence of a General Chilling Effect
While it is hard to quantify the amount of non-defamatory speech left unpublished in the United States due to fear of litigation, evidence suggests that it is significant. Well-known litigator David Boies claimed in 1996 that he believed the chilling effect among journalists-which prompted the Sullivan standard initially-remained "significant" despite heightened protection for defendants. 199 He recalled several instances where he was counseling a media client that hesitated or declined to publish a clearly non-defamatory story due to the risk of paying to prove it was non-defamatory in court. 200 Further, the chilling effect has been shown empirically to be a legitimate phenomenon in some criminal contexts. 201 That is, when a statute sets criminal liability at a certain point, the amount of conduct that approaches that point decreases.
202
Defamation's chilling effect is especially apparent in the field of psychology. Due in part to Barry Goldwater's successful defamation suit against a magazine in the late sixties, the American Psychological Association now prohibits psychologists from making public comment about public figures' mental conditions. 203 This rule has sparked controversy among psychologists who decry it as an impermissible restriction of free speech. 204 Finally, the most direct examples of defamation's chilling effect on journalism are sporadic reports of American journalists who withhold publication due to fear of litigation. In one recent example, the American Bar Association refused to publish its report on Donald Trump's litigation history due to fear of a defamation suit. 205 Analyzing defamation's chilling effect in similar foreign jurisdictions also sheds light on the effect in the United States. Consider the effect of pro-plaintiff libel laws on media in Britain. In 1997, a group of British legal scholars published an in-depth report of the direct and structural influences that libel law had on various media outlets in the United Kingdom. 206 The researchers posited that defamation had a pervasive structural effect on the press by influencing how British journalists pursue and write stories based on the threat of liability.
207
They found that, in every branch of the British media, there were so-called "nogo areas" in which editors felt unsafe publishing. 208 Further, they suggested defamation liability forced the British press to be "polemical" rather than factoriented, and to adopt their lawyers' recommendations to cast factual assertions as opinion in order to avoid liability. 209 In the words of one journalist, in Britain "it is safer to write opaquely or make comment than it is to engage in clear and hard-edged investigative journalism." 210 Perhaps most striking is the British law's effect on British book publishers. After a spate of expensive defamation suits, publishers have simply ceased to deal in "high risk" investigative journalism because of the "horrendous costs" of defamation lawsuits. 211 One publisher noted that "[l]ibel costs have become a major inhibition when it comes to publishing lively and thus possibly contentious non-fiction."
212 Recent refusals to publish potentially controversial investigative journalism illustrate this chilling effect. In 2003, fear of defamation suits stopped Rachel Ehrenfeld's book-Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop it-from being published in the U.K, yet still exposed her to $250,000 in fines in the country after a Saudi businessman sued her for libel. 213 In 2014, Cambridge University Press refused to publish a book about Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin due to fear of litigation. 214 In a letter to the book's author, the publisher wrote that "[e]ven if the Press was ultimately successful in defending such a lawsuit, the disruption and expense would be more than we could afford [.] " 215 Finally, due to libel concerns, publishers refused for years to publish a book investigating abuses by the Scientologist church authored by Pulitzer-prize winning journalist Lawrence Wright. 216 The eventual independent book publisher, whom some in the media have labeled a "brave man," faces looming court battles from the Church of Scientology.
217 Defamation liability also chills broadcasting freedom in Britain. An HBO documentary based on Wright's book was unavailable in the UK for some time. 218 Even a South Park episode mocking the Scientologist church was never aired in Britain.
219
While the foregoing examples demonstrate that defamation liability does chill media expression to some extent, they do not prove that the chilling effect is significant under the Sullivan standard in the United States. One could argue that the comparative systems are sufficiently distinct such that the clear effect in Britain provides no evidence of a chilling effect under the Sullivan standard in the U.S. But, while it may be easier to bring suit in the U.K., 220 there is reason to believe that the results of the British study can be extrapolated to the United States. Multiple elements of the American system make libel lawsuits in the U.S. just as, if not more, attractive to potential plaintiffs as the British system. First, in the United States, both parties pay their own litigation costs, whereas in Britain the losing party has to pay the other side's costs. 221 The British method decreases the effectiveness of using defamation lawsuits as a strategic tool for wealthy plaintiffs.
Second, the American regime is unique in that it couples the element of luck with historically exorbitant damages awards. Since actual malice is a question of fact often decided by a jury, there is always an element of luck in defamation cases. 222 Even with an extremely strong case, a defendant may lose if they are in an unfriendly jurisdiction. 223 As one author stated: [w]hen a case goes to a jury, the Sullivan rule means little or nothing. All those phrases designed by the Supreme Court to protect freedom of speech and press may not in fact be applied. When a judge's charge lasts an hour or more, and one sentence speaks of the need to find "reckless disregard," it rolls right past the jurors [.] . . . 224 This element of luck is particularly troubling given the potential for astronomical damages awards in the United States. Of the ten largest damages awards against media outlets, eight stemmed from libel lawsuits. 225 Of those eight, five involved news reporting on the government or some other public issue. 226 The damages in those five verdicts ranged from around $19 million to $227 million, and three of those damages awards were upheld on appeal.
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News of these awards can be extremely disturbing for media outlets, especially when in each of these cases, "the huge verdicts were sustained under circumstances where one can at least reasonably question whether the applicable standards were satisfied." 228 In Britain, in contrast, journalists believe that damages awards exceeding five figures are exceedingly rare. 229 So, while defamation lawsuits may be more common in Britain, unique features of the American system level the playing field to some extent and make Britain a probative case study.
While direct, empirical evidence of a chilling effect in the United States under the Sullivan standard is difficult to conjure, the anecdotal evidence mentioned previously certainly supports this effect. 230 Further, the empirical evidence of this effect in Britain-whose journalists face a comparable defamation regime to those in the U.S.-provides support for the effect's existence despite the Sullivan standard. However, additional evidence is necessary to fully support the claim that a President's ability to sue poses a unique threat of chilling effect on political reporting. A case study from a developing country provides further insight on this point and a cautionary tale about presidential abuse of defamation suits.
Executive Defamation Suits' Chilling Effect on Political Media in Singapore
Autocratic Prime Ministers of Singapore have used civil defamation suits against foreign and domestic press entities to stifle negative reporting for decades. 231 Professor Cherian George described the gradual restriction of press freedom by leader Lee Kuan Yew during the decades he ruled as Prime Minister in the late Twentieth Century. 232 George notes that defamation lawsuits brought by the Prime Minister and his family were a key tactic for controlling the press. 233 In particular, any suggestion that the Prime Minister's family members were given their government positions due to nepotism sparked swift defamation lawsuits. 234 This tactic caused media outlets to practice self-censorship and restrain their reporting tactics. 235 George reports that these lawsuits have basically frozen negative political speech due to the chilling effect. blogger Roy Ngerng. 241 One Singaporean journalist claimed this media assault has created a "culture where the government is assured of dominance, not just in the political sphere, but in controlling the narratives and frames that we use to understand the society we live in." 242 Although it is difficult to quantify defamation law's chilling effect on presidential reporting in the United States, there is strong evidence that it has an influence on American journalism. The more concerning issue, though, is the potential for abuse of defamation lawsuits spawning a far more pronounced chilling effect. The Singaporean Prime Ministers' success in stifling dissent through defamation suits is a clear example of how defamation suits can be used to control and suppress political reporting. Although the Sullivan standard provides moderate protection, the potential for abuse and an intolerable chilling effect remain present.
D. Incentives
This final subsection addresses an intuitive counter-argument to a zeroliability regime: the lack of incentives to report honestly if there is no defamation liability. Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago has analyzed the Sullivan standard through a law-and-economics lens and concluded that it does not appropriately calibrate incentives to maximize social utility. 243 Instead, he argues, "common law rules of defamation (sensibly controlled on the question of damages) represent a better reconciliation of the dual claims of freedom of speech and the protection of individual reputation than does the New York Times rule that has replaced it." 244 In his analysis, Epstein analyzes the zero-liability rule of defamation-i.e., the Black and Douglas position that the press should be immune from defamation suits by public officials. 245 He concludes that the rule would be unworkable because "[a] world without any protection against defamation is a world with too much defamation, too much misinformation-in a word, too much public fraud." 246 When the zero-liability rule is applied to all public officials, Epstein's concern is that there are steep social costs to such a rule. First, he claims the quality of candidates for public office might deteriorate because those with the best reputations would be at the greatest potential risk for media defamation, and we might see a rise in candidates with "lesser reputation and perhaps lesser character." 247 Second, the quality of public discourse would decline because the press, unconcerned with potential defamation liability, would likely make more When applied to all public officials more broadly, these arguments are somewhat compelling. However, when the arguments are applied to a zeroliability rule for speech concerning only the President, they lose their footing. First, it is unlikely that the possibility of defamation will deter people from seeking the most powerful office in the world. The 2016 presidential election provided no indication that defamatory conspiracy theories or claims about misconduct generally deter candidates for running for the presidency.
Second, Epstein claims that the private benefit to journalists of printing defamatory material about public figures in a world with zero liability is greater than the private cost. 249 That is, with no liability for potential defamation, journalists would have too few incentives to tell the truth. This claim mistakenly assumes that legal liability is the only barrier standing in the way of a press corps eager to lie to and deceive the public. This assumption is particularly untrue with respect to reporting on the President and White House. Specifically, Epstein's argument does not consider several other costs associated with false presidential reporting.
Strong institutional constraints on false reporting incentivize reporters not to defame the President regardless of potential legal liability. The Press has a historically symbiotic relationship with the executive branch. 250 Reporters rely on officials within the White House for news, and officials rely on the media to publicize their programs and give them important information about undercurrents in Washington. 251 This relationship is built completely on trust and credit. 252 Reporters trust officials to give them full information when possible and officials rely on reporters not to report something that officials want to keep hidden from the public. 253 This trust, in turn, builds reputations for journalists among public officials and colleagues in Washington. 254 When news organizations do something to lose that trust or tarnish their reputation, like publish a story based on a discredited source, they can be excommunicated from the White House entirely. 255 Publishing a false or defamatory report, then, has grave consequences for a reporter's career. Beyond access to the White House, news outlets risk losing market share and followers when they are discredited, 257 and being kicked out of journalistic organizations and trade groups. 258 These factors act as powerful incentives for reporters to report accurately about the president and other public officials. While it is difficult to know the exact weight these factors have in shaping the conduct of reporters who investigate the President, Epstein's claim relies on the unsupported assumption that the threat of litigation is somehow inherently more powerful than these other consequences. To the contrary, evidence suggests that even with no liability rules, the Press' conduct would remain relatively honest due to the other institutional implications for lying. Thus, Epstein's criticism of a zero-liability rule falls flat when applied to the President. Presidential reporting constitutes a unique organ of the media that has strong incentives to tell the truth regardless of potential defamation lawsuits. This is further support for a complete bar on Presidential defamation actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
If a presidential defamation claim ever reaches the Supreme Court, the foregoing considerations strongly support the Court's adoption of a zero-liability rule for presidential reporting. The President is without a doubt a different sort of public official than the Court has ever considered in a defamation case. While the President's reputation is important, it does not justify a rule that can inhibit speech or be aggressively misused. As Justice Black stated, "[t]his Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public affairs and public officials. But I doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can be made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials."
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Federal Courts have limited jurisdiction and, as a result, limited power to shape public policy. Interpreting the Constitution and holding the government accountable to the admirable principles and vision expressed therein are some of the few tools the "least dangerous branch" has been granted. The Constitution specifically casts the judiciary as the guardian of the free press vis-à-vis the First Amendment, and the Court must live up to its responsibility to ensure the other branches of government do not abuse the Fourth Estate. Implementing press immunity from presidential defamation lawsuits is an important step in fulfilling about-fake-news-shows-that-major-media-outlets-are-still-seen-as-credible/.
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